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This paper aims to illustrate the interdependencies between key epidemiological and
economic factors that influence the control of many livestock infectious diseases. The
factors considered here are (i) farmer heterogeneity (i.e., differences in how farmers
respond to a perceived disease risk), (ii) off-farm effects of farmers’ actions to control
a disease (i.e., costs and benefits borne by agents that are external to the farm), and
(iii) misalignment between privately and socially optimal control efforts (i.e., privately
optimal behavior not conducive to a socially optimal outcome). Endemic chronic diseases
cause a wide range of adverse social and economic impacts, particularly in low-income
countries. The actions taken by farmers to control livestock diseases minimize some of
these impacts, and heterogeneity in those actions leads to variation in prevalence at the
farm level. While some farmers respond to perceived disease risks, others free-ride on
the actions of these individuals, thereby compromising the potential benefits of collective,
coordinated behavior. When evaluating a plausible range of disease cost to price of
control ratios and assuming that farmers choose their privately optimal control effort,
we demonstrate that achievement of a socially optimal disease control target is unlikely,
occurring in <25% of all price-cost combinations. To achieve a socially optimal disease
control outcome (reliant on farmers’ voluntary actions), control policies must consider
farmer heterogeneity, off-farm effects, and the predicted uptake of control measures
under the assumption of optimized behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
Livestock production is vital to economic development in many low-income countries,
contributing to poverty alleviation, investment in children’s education, and food security (1, 2).
Infectious diseases jeopardize these societal functions, yet their control has become increasingly
reliant upon privately funded actions (3–8). This “voluntary approach” to disease control distributes
costs and responsibility between private agents (farmers that invest in control measures) and the
government (animal health authorities that promote and often regulate farmers’ actions) (9). The
problem of the voluntary approach is that self-interested behavior can fail to produce a socially
optimal level of disease control (i.e., the level of disease control that maximizes the sum of all
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agents’ payoffs in society, the social optimum) (8, 10). Themarket
thus “fails” to achieve the social optimum.
One reason for such “market failure” in disease control is the
presence of externalities: costs and benefits borne by agents who
are not parties to a market transaction (8). Externalities can be
positive (e.g., a farmer enjoys a lower risk of disease incursion
into his herd when neighboring farmers vaccinate their animals)
or negative (e.g., a farmer has a higher risk of disease incursion
into his herd when other farmers sell sick animals into a livestock
market). One farmer’s investment in animal health can thus
influence other farmers’ levels of disease risk. The way individual
farmers perceive and act upon their level of risk may fail to
produce a social optimum: some farmers free-ride on the control
efforts of others, and the potential benefits of one farmer’s actions
can be limited by others’ inaction (9, 11). Achieving the socially
optimal level of disease control often requires governments to
intervene (e.g., through financial incentives and regulation) in
a way that accounts for the nature of farmers’ decision-making
processes and the interdependencies between farmers’ choices
and disease dynamics (3, 8, 9, 12–19).
The way farmers perceive and respond to disease risks is
not only affected by disease spread but also impacts upon it.
There are feedback processes between how a disease spreads
and the responses of farmers to changing risks (20–22). When
the inter-dependent dynamics of economic, behavioral, and
epidemiological factors are not understood or well-represented in
models of disease transmission, then policies aimed at promoting
farmers’ action may have perverse effects (23–26).
Our objective in this paper is to illustrate interdependencies
between key epidemiological and economic factors that are not
consistently taken into account in models of livestock diseases:
(i) farmer heterogeneity (i.e., differences between farmers in how
they respond to perceived risks); (ii) associated externalities; and
(iii) misalignment between privately and socially optimal control
efforts. We demonstrate the impact of farmer heterogeneity
on disease prevalence over time. We quantify the externalities
associated with farmer heterogeneity and show how the outcome
of any individual farmer’s control effort depends on the behavior
of others. Finally, we examine a farmer’s decision in trading-off
ex ante disease prevention expenditure and ex post treatment
expenditure and output loss, to estimate the probability that
adoption of privately optimal behavior will achieve a socially
optimal disease control target. The consequences of a socially
sub-optimal control level depend on, among other factors, the
population at risk. Here, for simplicity and to illustrate the
general case, groups of farmers represent society.
METHODS
We explore the relationships between epidemiological and
economic factors using a deterministic compartmental model
(27). The model assumes a chronic infectious disease of livestock
with a low basic reproduction number (R0 = 1.11), a livestock
species with an average lifespan of five time units, and a constant
herd size over time (250 animals on farm). We apply the model
in three scenarios that explore farmer heterogeneity, quantify
externalities, and examine differences between privately and
socially optimal control efforts. In all scenarios, the animal-
level prevalence in each farm starts at 10% (the endemic
equilibrium, i.e., when prevalence remains steady and the
effective reproductive number, Re, is 1.00). We simulate the time
required to achieve a prevalence of <2% following a hypothetical
awareness-raising event (e.g., information provision at time zero)
and a time horizon of 25 time units. This target prevalence of
<2% represents an economic optimum from society’s perspective
(i.e., the socially optimal level of disease control). A 2% threshold
can also be considered a prevalence level below which costly
government-led strategies aimed at eliminating the disease (e.g.,
test-and-slaughter) are required (28). In our simulations, for
simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume infected
animals show chronic symptoms and lose productivity, but there
is no disease-associatedmortality or infertility. Individuals can be
either susceptible or infected; once infected, they remain infected
and infectious for the remainder of their lives. Complete recovery
from the disease is not possible.
The model set-up is as simple as possible for demonstration
purposes. The basic features are (i) two states (susceptible—S;
and infected—I), (ii) continuous time steps, (iii) equal birth and
death rates (α = µ = 0.20), and (iv) an initial transmission
rate (β) of approximately 8.89 × 10−4, reflecting the endemic
equilibrium. The model can be run with one or more farms,
and disease transmission can occur within farm only or both
within and between farms. The proportion of the initial overall
β attributable to between-farm transmission (q) is 0.0 when there
is no transmission between farms, and 0.1 when between-farm
transmission is included. The amount of control effort applied
on farm is represented by a proportionate reducer on β (rβi ). The
model’s differential equations are as follows:
dSi
dt




























Ij − µIi (2)
The differential equations were solved in R (29) (version 3.6.2)
with the package deSolve (30) (version 1.27.1). All plots were
generated using the ggplot2 package (version 3.3.0) (31).
We demonstrate the effect of farmer heterogeneity on
the predicted prevalence of disease over time by simulating
transmission-reducing measures in three farms following a
hypothetical awareness-raising event. As farmers continually
assess the benefits and costs of their actions over time, the amount
of control effort in each farm is set to be a function of disease
prevalence (pi). We assume that (i) disease transmission occurs
within each farm only, and (ii) as the prevalence (and disease
impact) at the farm declines, the control effort applied (rβi ) also
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where γi represents the farmer responsiveness. γ was set at
0.025, 0.100, and 0.175 for the farmer that is “highly responsive,”
“moderately responsive,” and “slightly responsive,” respectively.
Note that, as the prevalence decreases in any farm due to
the control effort applied, the farmer responsiveness does not
change—it is a characteristic of each individual farmer.
We then estimate the off-farm effects (externalities) of
livestock disease control in two of the above farms: one in which
the farmer is highly responsive and the other in which the farmer
is slightly responsive. Firstly, we quantify the ex post cost of
disease over time at the farm level by assigning a monetary value
(δ) to the cost of each infected animal per time step. We assume
that the ex post cost of the disease varies linearly with prevalence
(i.e., the cost per time step is the product of the number of
infected animals and the cost per infected animal). We then
compare the ex post cost of disease over time in each farm when
the transmission rate between farms (bβ) is 0% (q is 0.0) and
10% (q is 0.1) of the initial within-farm transmission rate (wβ).
Actions taken by each farmer to reduce transmission in their
farms only reduce the wβ—and do not influence bβ, which is kept
constant over time. By holding the bβ constant over time and at
a common value for the two farms, we demonstrate the off-farm
effects of on-farm actions only—this assumes that (i) the contact
rate between farms is kept constant, and (ii) the force of infection
is proportional to the number of infected animals on each farm.
Variation in farm number and density is unlikely to affect the
qualitative inferences from this simulation.
We define “cost of disease” as the sum of disease-related
output loss (production potential that is not realized over time)
and expenditure on treatment of infected animals, plus the
cost of control. Treating infected animals does not affect their
infectiousness. Cost of control refers to money spent on reducing
the wβ to prevent new cases, for instance, through improvements
in hygiene and biosecurity. The cost of disease can thus be split
into ex ante cost (cost of control) and ex post cost (disease-related
output loss and treatment-related expenditure).
We demonstrate themarket failure in livestock disease control
by comparing the private net profit of farmer i (Πi) with the
social net profit (Πs), the sum of the private net profits of n
farmers (Πs =
∑n
i=1 Πi). Πi denotes the private net profit of
farmer i for the whole simulation period of 25 time units (Πi =
∑25
t=1 Πit). The example has only two farmers for simplicity, so
Πs = ΠR + Πr ; the social net profit is the net profit of the highly
responsive farmer (R) plus the net profit of the slightly responsive
farmer (r). Considering that the benefit (bi, the number of animal
infections averted) enjoyed by the highly responsive farmer as
a result of disease control effort is a function of control effort











), the net profit ΠRt (in time step t) is given
by δbR − θr
β
R , where δ is the ex post cost per infected animal
(treatment expenditure and output loss), and θ is the unit price
of control action (the price of reducing the transmission rate by
1%). For this simulation, we assume that δ and θ are fixed at 50
and 0.10 monetary units, respectively.
We examine the effect of optimizing behavior on disease
prevalence by assuming that the farmer reduces the wβ so that
the total cost of the disease (the sum of ex ante and ex post costs)
at each time step is minimized (32). This process is repeated
iteratively for each level of the unit price of control (θ , ranging
from 0.00 to 1.25 monetary units per time step) and ex post cost
per infected animal (δ, ranging from 10 to 85 monetary units
per time step). We assume (conservatively) that (i) the farmer
has perfect information of both the ex ante and ex post costs of
disease, and (ii) their behavior is no longer determined by a pre-
specified logistic function. Instead, at each time step, the farmer
reviews and optimizes their control effort given the prevalence.
The short planning horizon (one time step, equivalent to one-
fifth of the animals’ average lifespan) reflects the generally high
time-preference rates in low-income countries (33).
The qualitative inferences drawn from the model outputs are
observed under a range of alternative scenarios and assumed
parameter values. Readers can explore different scenarios and
assumptions in the interactive web application, which is available
here: http://boydorr.gla.ac.uk/eemodel/epiecon. This application
was developed with shiny (34) (version 1.4.0) and shinydashboard
(35) (version 0.7.1) packages in R (29). The R script for all
the simulations is available at: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.
4108335.
RESULTS
The Impact of Farmer Heterogeneity
The prevalence of the disease is estimated over time within
three model farms managed by three different “types” of farmers
who vary in their responsiveness to an awareness-raising event.
The responsiveness level of each farmer type is given by a
behavioral parameter (γi). The model uses this parameter in a
logistic function that determines the reduction in transmission
rate caused by each farmer’s different actions at any given level
of prevalence (Figure 1A). For instance, at the initial prevalence
of 10%, (i) the highly responsive farmer reduces transmission
by 100% (red solid line), (ii) the moderately responsive farmer
reduces transmission by 50% (green dotted line), and (iii)
the slightly responsive farmer does not reduce transmission
at all (blue dashed line). The impacts of these three levels of
responsiveness on disease prevalence over time are shown in
Figure 1B. The heterogeneity in farmer responsiveness has an
impact on the level of control effort applied and thus on the
reduction in prevalence achieved. Among the three farmer types,
only the highly responsive type achieves the target prevalence
(i.e., <2%) within 25 time units.
Externalities: The Off-Farm Effects of
Farmers’ Control Actions
Now we model disease prevalence in two neighboring
farms (managed by highly and slightly responsive farmers,
respectively), allowing for between-farm transmission, to explore
the off-farm effects of farmers’ control actions upon within-farm
and societal costs of disease, represented by the sum of costs over
the two neighboring farms.
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FIGURE 1 | Effect of farmer type on disease prevalence following a common starting prevalence and a hypothetical awareness-raising event (at time zero). (A) Control
effort applied (percentage reduction in transmission rate—β—within the farm in relation to the initial β in endemic equilibrium) as a function of disease prevalence for
three different farmer types. The vertical dash-dotted line indicates initial prevalence. (B) Disease prevalence over time within the three farms. In both panels, the gray
shaded area indicates the target prevalence level from society’s perspective (<2%).
For each farm, we estimate the ex post cost of disease over
time following an awareness-raising event. Figure 2 shows the
estimated ex post cost in two farms with and without between-
farm transmission. With no off-farm effects (i.e., bβ = 0, and
thus no effects of neighbor’s actions on costs), a highly responsive
farmer (solid red line) reduces prevalence and ex post cost.
In contrast, for a slightly responsive farmer (dotted blue line),
the prevalence and the ex post cost are unchanged over time.
When the off-farm effects or externalities are included (i.e.,
bβ > 0, transmission between farms is possible), the highly
responsive farmer sees a reduced benefit of their actions, and
the slightly responsive farmer benefits from their neighbor’s
actions (compared to the equivalent costs when bβ = 0). The
extent by which the first farmer (highly responsive) reduces
the prevalence of disease (and its associated cost) is limited by
the force of infection originating from the second farm, where
the farmer is only slightly responsive. Also, despite the lack of
control action, the prevalence and ex post cost of disease at the
second farm drops over time as a result of a decreasing force of
infection originating from the first farm, where the prevalence is
decreasing due to the control measures applied. Using a discount
rate of 5%1, the extent of market failure2 is the difference between
the Π s (849 monetary units) and ΠR (695 monetary units). This
1The discount rate accounts for the decreasing value of benefits and costs over time
in “real terms,” as viewed from the present.
2More details available here: http://boydorr.gla.ac.uk/eemodel/epiecon.
difference is due to the benefits enjoyed by the slightly responsive
farmer, who does not incur any costs of control.
Privately Optimal Behavior and Reductions
in Prevalence
Here we model disease prevalence (with a single farm and bβ
= 0) to establish if privately optimal actions of a farmer will
achieve the socially optimal target prevalence (i.e., <2%). The
prevalence over time assuming privately optimal behavior for
different unit prices of control (from “free” to “high”) is shown
in Figure 3. Following an awareness-raising event (at time zero)
and assuming a fixed ex post cost per infected animal (δ = 50
monetary units), the extent by which the within-farm prevalence
is reduced varies inversely with the unit price of control (θ).
Achieving the socially optimal target prevalence is possible if the
unit price of control is very low. Disease elimination (prevalence
below 0.4% or <1 infected animal in a herd of 250; note
that the predicted prevalence is strictly continuous) only occurs
when the unit price of control is equal or <0.05 monetary
units (first line above “free” in Figure 3). When the unit price
of control is above 0.05 monetary units, the farmer’s optimal
control effort either reduces the prevalence until it reaches a
new endemic equilibrium or does not reduce it at all (shown as
the uppermost flat line in Figure 3; the prevalence remains at
the initial endemic equilibrium level). This model of optimizing
behavior shows that self-interested farmers, who optimize their
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FIGURE 2 | Externalities occurring as a result of different effort to achieve disease control in two neighboring farms. Arrows indicate a simulation scenario shift, from
absence of transmission between farms (bβ = 0) to a situation in which between-farm transmission is possible (bβ > 0). Assuming an ex post cost per infected animal
per time step (δ) of 50 monetary units, the labels “Low,” “Medium,” and “High” on the right vertical axis correspond to 313, 781, and 1,250 monetary units. Blue and
red shaded areas correspond to the positive and negative externalities, respectively. The gray shaded area indicates the target prevalence level from society’s
perspective (<2%).
private investment in disease control, as assumed here, may not
achieve the target prevalence from society’s perspective in the
absence of an intervention by, for example, the government.
In our simulations, under the assumption of optimizing
farmer behavior, as prevalence drops, the marginal cost of control
actions (i.e., the cost of reducing the prevalence by an additional
unit, 1%), increases sharply. It is more expensive to reduce the
prevalence from 3 to 2% than from 10 to 9% because the number
of cases prevented per time step by reducing the transmission
rate depends on the number of currently infected individuals. If
the number of currently infected individuals is high (e.g., 10%
prevalence), the prevention of new cases yields a quick reduction
in prevalence. If the number of currently infected individuals is
low (e.g., 3% prevalence), further reductions of the prevalence
rely to a greater extent on the elimination of currently infected
individuals. Under the assumption of optimizing behavior, as
the marginal costs of control increase, the farmer’s investment
in control therefore gradually declines until an equilibrium is
reached in both epidemiological and economic terms (shown as
the plateau for each line in Figure 3). This equilibrium prevalence
level is reached when the ex ante expenditure in one time step
equals the averted ex post cost of disease.
The achievement of a socially optimal outcome prevalence
depends on the specific values of the unit price of control and
cost per infected animal selected. The results shown in Figure 3
considered a fixed ex post cost of one infected animal (δ =
50 monetary units). However, for the same disease and animal
species, this value could in practice vary with the price of
livestock, cost of production inputs, type of production system,
etc. Figure 4 shows the predicted prevalence after 25 time units
for a range of values of price per control unit and a range of
values of ex post cost per infected animal. When we allow the
cost per infected animal to vary in plausible ranges in relation
to the price of control unit (e.g., eliminating disease transmission
by 100% would cost a maximum of 125 monetary units per time
step, which is <1.5 times the highest ex post cost of one infected
animal, i.e., 85 monetary units), the previously observed pattern
holds: farmers who optimize their control effort may not achieve
the target prevalence from society’s perspective.
DISCUSSION
Analytical frameworks introducing human behavioral dynamics
in the field of livestock infectious disease modeling have emerged
in the last two decades. From the pioneering works of Bicknell
et al. (24) and McInerney et al. (32) to the most recent
individual-based, network-based, and game-theoretic models
(9, 36–38), many significant contributions have improved our
understanding of the interplay between human behavior and
livestock disease spread (and the likelihood of disease control).
However, this study is unique and contributes to that body of
knowledge for two reasons. Firstly, it provides a simple but robust
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FIGURE 3 | Disease prevalence over time, assuming privately optimal behavior in a single farm for a range of prices per control unit. This simulation assumes a cost of
one infected animal per time step (δ) of 50 monetary units. The price of reducing the transmission rate by 1% (θ ) ranges from “Free” (0.00 monetary units) to “High”
(1.25 monetary units). “Low” and “Medium” correspond to 0.40 and 0.85 monetary units, respectively. Colored lines represent increases by 0.05 monetary units. The
gray shaded area indicates the target prevalence level from society’s perspective (<2%). The black dotted horizontal line indicates a prevalence consistent with
disease elimination (0.4%; <1 infected animal in a herd of 250 animals).
framework for exploring key factors in the control livestock
diseases: farmer heterogeneity, externalities, and private-social
misalignment of control optima. Secondly, we apply this
framework to the control of endemic chronic diseases through
privately funded actions in a low-resource setting.
Despite the growing literature on livestock infectious disease
modeling, very little attention has been given to the assumption
of homogeneous human behavior, the validity of which we
evaluate here. Models of livestock disease typically assume that
the farmers’ perception of risk and the way they respond to
that level of perceived risk remain unchanged over time (22). In
addition, many epidemiological models entirely ignore the effects
of changing prevalence on privately optimal spending on disease
control (22, 23). However, several empirical studies have shown
that a farmer’s likelihood to take control actions is the result
of a dynamic and complex interplay between epidemiological,
economic, environmental, cultural, and social factors (39–43).
Models of disease transmission that ignore such heterogeneity are
likely to be misleading, resulting in reduced value for informing
control efforts. Like many decision-makers, farmers make
decisions based on conscious and unconscious, cognitive and
affective shortcuts or rules of thumb (42, 44, 45). We model the
implications of this type of individual decision-making process
by simulating the effects on prevalence and costs of different
levels of farmer responsiveness. These simulations quantify the
consequences of heterogeneous behavior, the occurrence of
externalities, and the consequent disparities between privately
and socially optimal control efforts.
The simulations of our theoretical scenario of optimizing
behavior assumed perfect information and rational behavior by
the individual farmer. In this scenario, the farmer was able to
accurately choose the optimal control effort at any point in time
by trading-off the marginal benefits of reducing the prevalence
against the marginal costs of their actions. These models assume
a conservative range of values for the unit price of control action
(from 0.00 to 1.25 monetary units to reduce the transmission
rate by 1% per time step) and cost of one infected animal
(from 10 to 85 monetary units per time step). For example,
without administration and overhead charges, the annual cost of
vaccinating a herd of 250 cattle for brucellosis in India (167.50
USD; 0.67 USD times 250) would be over twice as much the
average loss caused by brucellosis per infected animal (73.44
USD) (46). The values that we used are considered appropriate
and conservative for this evaluation because the highest possible
cost of eliminating disease transmission completely would be
equivalent to <1.5 times the highest ex post cost of one infected
animal per time step. Despite these conservative assumptions,
the societal disease control target was only achieved for high
disease cost to price of control ratios (<25% of all price-cost
combinations; Figure 4). Given these findings, we can infer that
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FIGURE 4 | Predicted prevalence at 25th time step for different values of price per control unit (“Free” = 0.00; “Low” = 0.40; “Medium” = 0.85; and, “High” = 1.25
monetary units) and ex post cost per infected animal (“Low” = 10; “Medium” = 46; and, “High” = 85 monetary units), assuming privately optimal behavior in a single
farm. The polygon with gray border indicates the target prevalence level from society’s perspective (<2%).
effective disease control through voluntary actions is unlikely to
be privately optimal in many real-world cases. Additionally, as
prevalence decreases, there is a sharp increase in the marginal
costs of control action, which leads to a fall in optimal control
effort. This result is consistent with the economic principle
of diminishing returns and has also been reported by other
theoretical (32) and empirical studies, namely those that analyzed
control actions against tuberculosis (24, 47) and brucellosis (48,
49) in cattle.
Our model illustrates the misalignment of private and social
optima for livestock disease control through a basic trade-off
between the benefits of reductions in herd prevalence and the
costs of transmission-reducing actions. Essentially, farmers “buy
reductions in disease transmission,” which is a simple and logical
representation of many disease control actions. However, this
approach is likely to underestimate the gap between private and
social optima in many cases: the model does not capture many
of the benefits of farmers’ actions such as (i) the control of
multiple pathogens through improved biosecurity, and (ii) the
human health benefits in the cases of zoonoses. For instance,
brucellosis is a bacterial zoonosis that causes abortion in livestock
and debilitating symptoms (e.g., fever, joint pain, myalgia) in
humans (50, 51). Given this burden on human health, in
addition to animal health, voluntary actions taken by farmers to
control the disease in their livestock (e.g., through vaccination)
generate positive externalities, as society benefits from farmers’
actions whilst not bearing the costs of these actions. This is a
market failure that requires coordinated action to achieve socially
optimal outcomes in terms of both human and animal health
and productivity (48). Hence, the benefits enjoyed and the costs
born by both public and private sectors must be considered
throughout the planning phase of control interventions, which
can include, among others, the provision of subsidized goods and
services (e.g., vaccination), creating and enforcing regulations
(e.g., movement restrictions) and setting compensation schemes
(e.g., for culled seropositive animals) (8, 48).
To enable private farmers’ actions to achieve a socially optimal
disease control target, policy design and development must
consider the heterogeneity of farmer behavior, the associated
off-farm effects or externalities, and the predicted uptake of
control measures under optimized farmer behavior. Failure to
acknowledge these factors may result in potentially misleading
predictions about disease transmission and the associated
economic costs. This, in turn, perpetuates conditions in which
private investments by farmers are inadequate to achieve disease
control from society’s perspective. For multi-host diseases that
can impact multiple sectors (e.g., multi-host livestock diseases
and zoonoses), inadequate disease control can have profound
repercussions on international trade and, indeed, threaten
human health.
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